

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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“ It is worthy of remark, that *three* out of the six traitors, who were executed with DESPARD, were of that mischievous, plotting sect, denominated *Methodists*. Despard himself appears to have been a settled Atheist; so that, of those who had any sense of religion, of any sort, the Methodists made exactly *one half*: no bad criterion of the *loyalty* of those gloomy and dangerous fanatics, who are, by a system of affiliation the most complete that ever was imagined, carrying their baneful influence into the family of every poor man in the kingdom.”—POLITICAL REGISTER, 26th February, 1803.

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## LETTER IV.

July 16, 1803.

DEAR SIR;—In my last letter I took the liberty of stating to you some ideas of mine concerning the plan, which I think it would be wise for this country to adopt for carrying on the war, in which it is at present engaged with France. I then stated to you, that I could make the restitution of the monarchy of France in the person of the legitimate Prince, the avowed object of it.—That such an object is perfectly consistent with the views, on which the ministers, the parliament, and the country, do think and declare the present war necessary, cannot be denied by any one. But I should be inclined to go further, and to state that the very arguments adduced by ministers in proof of the necessity of the war, (arguments which I am far from disputing, and which I only blame them for not seeing and acting upon soon enough and vigorously enough,) these very arguments, I say, render it absolutely necessary that they should adopt this object, or be inconsistent with themselves.—For what is their argument.—They state that we are “at war because we cannot be at peace,” and the reason that we cannot be at peace is, that there exists in the government of France that hostile mind, such a rooted and implacable enmity and feeling of hostility against this country, as can never be appeased or extinguished; and which, considering the little regard to treaties and the most solemn engagements, which that government shows in its conduct to other powers, renders it highly dangerous for any country to put itself off its guard, or to enter into any compact with it. Very good and solid arguments these, good now, good 20 months ago when the treaty of peace was in agitation. Mr. Windham, as I recollect, then stated them to the House of Commons, and to the country; the facts were then disputed, the existence of that hostile spirit was most unequivocally denied by Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh; the former of whom asserted,

that Buonaparté had asked pardon for his former conduct both of God and man!! In one of the Parliamentary Debates (a little before Christmas I think it was, certainly not sooner) I recollect that Mr. Windham alluding to the necessity of the last war, said “that he wondered gentlemen were not at least convinced now, of the necessity of it, if by no other argument, at least by the then existing proof, of the dangers and calamities of a state of peace with the French revolutionary government.”—That proof, however, was not enough to convince ministers of the instability of peace, of the unrelenting hostile mind of the First Consul; for though they had themselves thought proper to violate an express stipulation of the treaty, by giving orders to retain the Cape of Good Hope, and thereby to commit an act of actual hostility, yet they went on asserting over and over again the prospect of its permanence. Nay, so convinced were they of this, that they actually, just before Christmas, adopted a measure, which themselves stated to have been unfit to be adopted at other times, than during peace, because the effect of it would be “for a time to unhinge all the proceedings of the different boards and departments connected with the navy,” and when they were pressed on that very account to abstain from passing the measure as rapidly as they intended, and were begged to let it lye over till after the Christmas recess, that they themselves on the one hand, and every other member of Parliament on the other, might have time and opportunity to inquire and learn what the effect of such a measure could be; so great was their hurry to adopt this measure, which would have the effect above stated so completely, as to be unfit to be adopted in any time but that of “profound peace,” that they could not even delay it for six weeks.—On this occasion Mr. Addington himself stated, in reply to Lord Folkestone, who had proposed that delay, that though his Lordship might entertain such a gloomy view of things, as not to

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believe in the continuance of the present peace; yet he knew the country did not concur with him, and himself assuredly did not.—This was spoken about two months after the peace had actually been broken by the order of my Lord Hobart to retain the Cape—I have mentioned these facts, in order to prove how slow his Majesty's ministers have been to be convinced of the hostile mind and intentions of France; and in order to infer that if they at length are so convinced, no reasonable man can fail of being so, at least as fully, and as entirely as themselves.—They, then, and the country are now at length fully persuaded, that we cannot be at peace with the government of France, so long as it retains its present temper; its present hostile mind against us.—What then is the inference.—One of these things must follow; either, 1st, that temper must be changed; or, 2d, that government must be destroyed; or, 3d, we must never expect peace again.—Now with respect to these three alternatives, though, I doubtless, am a strenuous advocate for all the opinions of those who have been stigmatized as friends to eternal war; yet, I for one must unequivocally reject the 3d consequence, as a thing not to be endured, the thought of which can never even be entertained.—And least of all should I be willing to admit it at the present moment; when, I believe, the country is more in want of peace, than it ever was at any former period; rejecting therefore, this third alternative altogether, we must try the probability of our ever attaining the other two. With respect to any change in the temper or views of France, or its inclination towards this country, I for one do despair of ever seeing any such change so long as the revolution lasts. A jealousy between this country and France, a feeling of rivalry has existed, and even ought to exist; we used to feel it in England, and I think such a feeling is necessary for our safety. I think that is clearly proved now, for from the moment, when it began to be laid aside, we began that descent, which I fear we are still pursuing with increased momentum, and to the bottom of which we shall, without great exertion, soon arrive.—This is not the moment for entering into an argument on this point; but if it were, I think it might be proved, that the laying aside our jealousy of republican France, is one great cause of our present degradation; and that, as frequently it occurs in bodily complaints, that the more a particular diet or habit impairs the health, the more the patient becomes addicted to that habit; so with us, the lower our

want of jealousy carries us, the more feeble our jealousy itself seems to become.—But, to return. Such a rivalry between the two countries is necessary to the well being and existence of both.—But this rivalry is a very different thing from that bitter hostility, hatred, and animosity, which at present exists in the mind of the government of France against Great-Britain.—That feeling has many ingredients, more in number, and more bitter in quality, than any which could enter into a rivalry betwixt two legitimate governments.—It is, I am afraid, too powerful to feel that jealousy of our power, which is the principal and sole ingredient in the other case.—But on the other hand, it feels as a country, that this is now the only nation that stands between it and the government of the world.—It dreads the exertions, the means, the power, the abilities, of no other state.—No; not of Russia, Russia is corporating with it, she thinks for her own aggrandizement, but she is mistaken.—If Russia governs Asia, and France rules over Russia, who in fact is master of Asia? But this country has the means, has the power, has the ability, not only to prevent her attaining to universal empire, not only to check her triumphal progress, but to drive her back to her own limits, and to confine her to her own territory.—We know this not, nor ever shall, so long as the present ministers are endured.—But France knows it, every Frenchman knows it, and burning as they all do, with an enthusiastic love of glory, and inordinate lust of empire, they hate us, as they must hate those who may stand in the way of the gratification of their appetites.—And to this cause we may attribute all the moderation which the First Consul has displayed. I know it is fashionable to attribute to him every thing the very reverse of moderation; and two or three ridiculous acts of childish anger are brought as proof of his want of it. He may be passionate, he may be impetuous in his anger, and subject to fits of violent passion; but I maintain, that in his policy, he has been moderate; and I do think, that any man, who compares his power with our weakness, his energy with our debility, his activity with our slowness; will agree with me in that opinion. Do I rejoice at this? Do I think it is for good that he acts thus? I think he does so more surely to destroy us; and I think that for that purpose he has judged well.—He well knows how weak he is; he well knows on how crumbling and sandy a foundation his Empire is founded; he knows that if this country was roused to energy under proper hands,



the work of his destruction might soon be accomplished: his object, therefore, is not to rouse the country, but to suffer it to go drowsing on under the care of Mr. Addington and his feeble colleagues, till he is in full power to aim a deadly blow.—But, feeling as the First Consul does, how great the means we have to curtail his power, to clip his wings, he hates us with all that deadly hate, which every mind of strong passions feels towards the object which stands between it and its gratification.—But there is another cause of bitter hatred in the government of France against this country. The head of the government of France is not only the ruler of a country aiming at universal dominion, but is also the chief of a sect aiming at the destruction of civil society.—Lord Hawkesbury has said, that “Buonaparté has asked pardon of God and man.”—I never heard that Buonaparté had abjured jacobinism, and if I had heard it, I should not believe it. It is a stain which is never washed out; it is a nauseous draught, which when once swallowed ever after corrupts the health.—The blood of Lewis the XVIth will ever stick, like the drops of old King Malcom’s blood on the hands of Lady Macbeth, to the foreheads of all concerned; as yet, a sign of victory and success; but which might, with the means this country has in its hands, under the blessings of Providence, be converted into a sign of reproach, and a brand of infamy. This object of the sect has even hitherto co-operated with the object of the government.—They afford mutual assistance and support to each other. The labours of the sect prepare the way for the armies of the government; and the victories of the government enable them to promote the objects of the sect. Thus the scheme of universal empire, and that of the destruction of the christian religion, and of civil society go together. England could, if she chose, be the obstacle to the success of the one plan, as well as of the other; and she is hated for that reason, not as she deserves, but as she might deserve, if she chose. A jacobin sees in England, the possible upholder of the religion of Christ, of kingly government, of order, morality, and virtue. She might if she pleased be the champion of all these; and the successful champion too. The jacobin sees this and hates it accordingly; we see it not I fear, and I fear too do not deserve his hate. No; prithee jacobin spare your venom and your bile; we will let you go on without any restraint or opposition; we will ourselves blunt our swords, and break our musquets; give us

but peace, give us but our enjoyment of the name of peace, and we will not interfere with any of your plans, though you publish to the world by the sound of the trumpet, that our destruction is your object, and if you will force us into war, we promise you to wage it in such a way, so strictly defensively and so harmlessly, that your progress will be scarcely impeded; and you may march every soldier in France to conquer Asia, your shores will be as secure and untouched, as if guarded by your 500,000 men. Such as I have described is the spirit of hatred; the hostile mind which exists in the jacobinical government of France against this country; and which has existed without interruption or abatement from the beginning, so also will continue in all its violence to the end of the revolution. It is not the mind of Buonaparté, it is the mind of the revolutionary government, in whosoever hands and under whatsoever form it be. It was the mind of Marat, of Robespierre, of the Directory, it is the mind of Buonaparté, it will be the mind of his successor. No hope have we of change, but by destroying that poisonous source, whence all this rancour flows; by rooting out the tree which bears this deadly fruit, and giving it to be burned. What then must we do? What else but this—destroy the present government of France; the revolutionary jacobinical government, which for the misfortune of the world rules in that devoted country? And re-establish in its room, the legitimate royal government in the person of Lewis XVIII. The mode of doing this which I should adopt, would be that which I could contrive most plain, most unequivocal, most public, and most complete. I would immediately announce to the world, that I esteemed Lewis XVIII. lawful monarch, and would treat him as such; that I looked on the present chief of the government of France as a rebel and usurper. I would proclaim my intention of using every endeavour to destroy that usurpation, and of employing every means I had in my power to re-establish that monarchy. If I was not afraid of frightening you by any word so allied to chivalry, I should say, I would publish a crusade for accomplishing the object of this holy cause. These declarations I would endeavour to make known in every part of Europe, and especially in France; but I would not confine myself to declarations alone, I would proceed to acts agreeable to my professions. I would immediately appoint an Ambassador, and send him to the court of the King of France. I would make a treaty with him,



as with the Sovereign of France. By every law of nations, and by every rule of justice as such he must be considered; and as to his court, were he in a more miserable hovel than that, which he occupied on the mountains of the Harty at Blankenburg, that hovel would be a court; aye, and a court too, were he then alone, more stocked with virtuous principles, with true honour, with a real kingly mind, than many palaces where diamonds glitter all around one. The ambassador whom I should have pointed out would have been (if I could efface from my memory the events of the last twelve months) Lord Whitworth, that could not be now: a man who has once set his foot within the threshold of a regicide tyrant, or bowed to a jacobinical usurper, is from that moment disqualified to undertake so honourable a mission, as that to which I am alluding. I know no person whom I could designate; but I would have a person possessing all the following requisites. He should be a man of the best family, of great wealth, and above all, one who has never been guilty of the weakness of ever having once intermitted in his hostility to revolutionary doctrines. But this is not all, I would provide for his convenience and suitable state, as well as for his honour. I would have the Parliament vote him such a pension as would enable him to have something like the state of a king, whose progenitors had successively sat on a throne 1200 years. I would, moreover, invite him to this country, and assign him a place, where he might hold his court, and I would take care that it should be such an one, not as the King of Prussia's pitiful sufferance enabled him to hold at Blankenburg, nor such an one as the generous Paul enabled him to keep up at Mittau; but truly one that would become his royal race, and his lawful claims. This being done, I would invite all the potentates in Europe to join in a Congress, in which the general state of Europe should be discussed, and a plan formed for giving effect to legitimate claims, and for re-establishing order and the balance of power. To this Congress should Lewis XVIII. like every other prince send his ambassador; from such a privilege should the First Consul of France, the new Government of Holland, the President of the Italian Republic, and all other States, who are under any other government than that of their legitimate sovereigns of course be excluded. Usurpers can have nothing to do with law, nor can they take any part in the discussion of lawful claims. The place which I should prefer for the meet-

ing of this Congress, would be the Court of the King of France.—In the mean time I would prosecute his claims with vigorous exertions, or rather I would enable him to do so. I would give him the means of doing so effectually by every thing in my power. He should be the principal, I would be his auxiliary. The army that should be prepared for supporting these claims should be his army; the generals should be of his appointment; the plans should be of his own drawing. All that I could do, would be to enable him to execute these plans with vigour and effect. I would appoint a spot, where the standard of France might be displayed, and to which might be invited to come all the brave, loyal, and faithful adherents of their old master, and every other person of whatever country, whom the glory of the enterprize, the object to be obtained, or the honour likely to attend success might animate to do so. This army I would leave it to him to organize in any manner he should please. Its operations should be his own; if it was not sufficiently powerful for any object, I would give him succours; if he wanted ships to transport them, I would supply them; if he wanted money to pay them, or arms to arm them, or cloaths to dress them, all these things would I furnish; in short, I would send him forth an army as complete as I could make it, or as the most zealous friend to monarchy could wish.— This is the extent of my plan. Of its success I do not feel the smallest doubt. Something short of it may do some good, but I am convinced, that nothing short of the whole will do the whole good.— I have a good deal more to say to you on this subject, but my letter is already so thick, that I must defer it till another opportunity. In the mean time, in answer to some starts and expressions of surprize, which you, perhaps, and I know many others would make at parts of this plan, I would only ask, what is that, of which we are now being in dread? Of the King of France; or of the revolutionary government? And if I am told I am mad to propose such a scheme, I will say, that my object is to overthrow the revolutionary government, and then I will ask, what effect he thinks the adopting such measures would have on that government? For my own part I have not the slightest doubt, that if unequivocally adopted and vigorously acted on, we should see in six months time Lewis XVIII. reigning in France; and might make a peace with some little more prospect of permanence and security than



the treaty of Amiens could even give us hopes of; and mad as I am, warlike as I may be, this, I confess, would be in my mind an invaluable boon.—I am, &c.

INQUISITOR.

*Extract from the Moniteur of the 16th July, 1803.*

The measure which the English government has just adopted, in blockading the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, is a new infringement of the rights of neutrals and the sovereignty of all powers.—France, attacked by England, acquires the right of carrying the war into all the British possessions, and of getting possession, as she had done in former wars, of Hanover, which forms part of them; but she has not occupied the banks of the Elbe, except in the parts of which that conquest has put her in possession. She has respected the neutrality of Bremen, Hamburg, and other States of the Continent.—What circumstance then could have authorised the King of England to prohibit neutral powers from navigating the Elbe and the Weser? If the English flag cannot appear wherever a French battery can reach it, at least it ought not to prevent neutrals from navigating wherever the chances of war have carried the French armies, and from keeping up the connexions with each other. The Elbe and the Weser wash a large extent of neutral territories; the rivers that flow into them increase still more the commercial relations to which they afford an outlet; to shut the entrance to those rivers is to intercept the communications of a great part of the Continent; it is to commit an act of hostility against all the countries to which that navigation belongs.—England ought to have declared more frankly, that she will not suffer any neutral power; but will neutral powers suffer in their turn their flag and their rights to be despised?—If England wished to punish Germany for not having protected and defended Hanover, it is without doubt, as Prince of the Empire, that she has thought she had claims to that protection; yet how dare she claim the guarantee of the Members of the Empire at the moment she is violating the rights of one of them. The King of England, in his quality of Member of the Germanic Body, had consented to arrangements; had stipulated indemnities in favour of the Order of Malta, equally considered as a Prince of the Empire. Scarcely had his Britannic Majesty solemnly signed these dispositions, when he attacks the independence of the territory of the Order. He has no right to form for himself claims which might, with more justice, be formed against him.—In fine, the measure of shutting up the entrance of the principal rivers in Germany is, like all those which England has adopted for several months, an act of blindness which recoils upon herself. She breaks the links of her trade with Germany, and shuts up the principal means of introducing her merchandise into the Continent. She accustoms the people to do without the produce of her industry; she obliges them, in order to obtain articles equivalent to them, to apply to France, to whom, whilst the Elbe is shut, all the means of land conveyance remain open. Fury and passion are very bad counsellors.—The English journals announce, as a deed of arms of which they are proud, the carrying off French fishermen, and yet England acts in this instance again against herself. In rob-

bing the property of these miserable inhabitants of the coast, and in depriving their families of their supporters, they render that population, whose resources they have destroyed, desperate—they excite them to be more arduous in the defence of our territory, and in the avenging the country. They kindle the sentiment of hatred in the hearts of men who, by the obscurity and tranquillity of their lives, seemed to be less accessible to it.—Thus a bad action brings with it always fatal consequences—what is unjust is never profitable, and can only raise the general opinion against us.—It is the nature of man to refuse his interest and his wishes to enterprises contrary to equity and good faith; and whatever his prejudices may be, he ends always in being led to the cause that is most just. Alas! what would be the fate of Europe, if there were no power in it disposed to repress the ambition of a state which reckons treaties and justice as nothing!—The English minister follows the bent of his character well known to all Europe. Feeble men cannot obey reason; abandoned to their passions, they are always in excesses. A moderate conduct attests the vigour of a sound judgment: injustice and violence proceed from real weakness, as passion is the natural effect of a state of disease. How can the light of reason shine in the midst of the illusions of delirium? Are not the English people told every day that France is a prey to all disorders, and torn to pieces by factions; that the Government is without force, the public spirit without energy? Perhaps in speaking against the evidence of things, the ministers of his Britannic Majesty do not speak more against their consciences than a madman does when he shews to those around him the phantoms created by his imagination.—Woe to the people governed by men who are feeble, and who are without plan! Woe also to Europe if those men be to dispose of what yet remains of the power and prosperity of a great people.—The fifth Military Division has offered a day's pay to contribute to the expenses of the war against England.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Papers relative to the Conquest of Hanover, published at Paris, by order of the French Government, on the 14th of July, 1803.*

Twenty-four hours after the arrival of the Courier, with the Convention of Suhlingen, relative to the Army of the King of England in Hanover, the First Consul sent it to the English Government, in order to ascertain whether his Britannic Majesty would ratify it.—Citizen Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to Lord Hawkesbury the following letter:—

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to Lord Hawkesbury.—Paris, 21 Prairial (June 10).*

My Lord,—After a slight engagement with the troops of his Britannic Majesty, the French army occupies the country of Hanover.—The First Consul having had in view nothing but the procuring of pledges for the evacuation of Malta, and the completing the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, did not wish to make the subjects of his Britannic Majesty experience all the rigours of war. The First Consul, however, cannot ratify



the Convention concluded between the French army and his Britannic Majesty, and in that case, the First Consul charges me expressly to declare, that it is his intention that the army of the King of England be, in the first instance, exchanged for all the sailors or soldiers his Majesty's ships may have made or may be in the situation of making prisoners.—The First Consul would see with pain his Britannic Majesty, by refusing to ratify the said Convention, obliging the French Government to treat the country of Hanover with all the rigour of war, and, as a country which, left to itself, abandoned by its Sovereign, would be considered as conquered without capitulation, and given up to the direction of the power occupying it—I shall wait with impatience, my Lord, for your making known to me his Britannic Majesty's intentions.—Receive, my Lord, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) C. M. TALLEYRAND.

General Mortier received, at the same time, orders to announce to the General of the Army of the King of England in Hanover, that the First Consul would not make any difficulty to ratify the Convention of Suhlingen, as soon as his Britannic Majesty should have ratified it himself. There is not a single man of sense in Europe, who could have doubted for one moment, that the King of England would have ratified it.—Very great then was the astonishment when Lord Hawkesbury's reply was received.

*Reply of Lord Hawkesbury to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.—Downing Street, June 15, 1803.*

SIR,—I have laid before his Majesty your letter of the 10th instant. His Majesty has directed me to inform you, that as he has always considered the character of Elector of Hanover as distinct from his character of King of the United Kingdoms of Great-Britain and Ireland, he cannot consent to acquiesce in any act which might establish the idea that he is justly susceptible of being attacked in one capacity for the conduct he may have thought it his duty to adopt in another. It is not the first time that this principle has been advanced. It has been recognised by several powers of Europe, and more particularly by the French Government, which in 1795, in consequence of the accession of his Majesty to the Treaty of Basle, acknowledged his neutrality in his capacity of Elector of Hanover at the moment they were at war with him in his quality of King of Great-Britain. This principle has been moreover confirmed by his Majesty's conduct with respect to the Treaty of Luneville, and by the arrangements which have lately taken place relative to the German Indemnities, which were to have for their object the providing for the independence of the Empire, and which have been solemnly guaranteed by the principal powers of Europe, but in which his Majesty, as King of Great-Britain, took no part.—Under these circumstances his Majesty is determined, in his character of Elector of Hanover, to appeal to the Empire and to the powers of Europe who have guaranteed the Germanic Constitution, and consequently his rights and possessions in quality of Prince of that Empire.—Until his Majesty be informed of their sentiments, he has commanded

me to say, that in his character of Elector of Hanover, he will scrupulously abstain from every act which might be considered as contravening the stipulations contained in the Convention which was concluded on the 3d of June, between the Deputies appointed by the Regency of Hanover and the French Government.—I request you to accept the assurance of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be, Sir, your very humble and obedient Servant,

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

After the receipt of the above reply, it was made known to Gen. Mortier, that by the refusal of the ratification on the part of his Britannic Majesty, the Convention of Suhlingen was considered as null and void.

*Copy of the Letter written by Lieutenant-General Mortier, to Marshal Count Walmoden.—Luneburg, 11 Messidor, June 31.*

I had the honour to inform your Excellency, that the First Consul would fully approve of the Convention of Suhlingen, if the King of England would consent to ratify it himself. It is painful to have to acquaint you, that Lord Hawkesbury has made known to Citizen Talleyrand, that his Britannic Majesty has solemnly refused that ratification.—Your Excellency will recollect, that in 1757, a similar Convention was concluded at Closter-Seven, between M. De Richelieu and the Duke of Cumberland, and that the King of England not having chosen to adhere to it, he gave orders to his army to recommence hostilities.—It is to avoid the renewal of the scenes that took place then, that my government directs me to inform your Excellency, that the refusal of his Britannic Majesty renders the Convention of Suhlingen null.—It is evident Marshall, that England sacrifices unworthily your troops, whose bravery is known to all Europe; but it is not less notorious, that every plan of defence on your part would be illusory, and would only draw down new miseries upon your country.—I have desired General Berthier, Chief of the General Etat Major, to make known my proposals to you. I must insist upon a categorical reply from your Excellency, in twenty-four hours. The army I have the honour to command is ready, and only waits for the signal of battle. I beg your Excellency to believe in my very distinguished consideration.

(Signed) ED. MORTIER.

*Letter from General Mortier to the First Consul, dated Head-quarters, Luneburgh, July 6.*

CITIZEN FIRST CONSUL.—I wrote on the 30th of June to Marshal Walmoden, the letter of which I subjoin a copy. Baron de Bock, Colonel of the regiment of guards, came to me from him on the following day. He told me that the proposition for his army to lay down their arms in order to be sent prisoners of war into France, was of a nature so humiliating, that they preferred perishing with their arms in their hands; that they had made sufficient sacrifices for their country by the capitulation of Suhlingen, that it was now time for them to do something for their own honour; that the officers and the army were reduced to despair. Mr. De Bock then represented to me the extreme sincerity with which the Hanoverians had scrupulously fulfilled all the articles of the convention of Suhlingen, so far as they concerned them; that their conduct with respect to us was free from any kind of reproach, and that it ought not to draw



upon them the misfortune with which I threatened them. I, on my part, exclaimed against the— of the King of England, who had refused to ratify the convention of the 3d of June; that it was the Machiavelism of England alone which they ought to blame, and that it was the constant practice of that government to sacrifice them, as it had sacrificed its friends on the Continent.—M. De Bock is a man full of honour and sincerity. He told me that if I could make any acceptable propositions, such as to send back a part of the army in six months, to keep a detachment of five or six thousand men at Lauenburg, &c. he believed the Marshal would consent to the arrangement. My answer was in the negative, and we parted. I had before made all my dispositions for passing the river. A number of barques collected, as well on the Elbe as on the Elmenau, had afforded me ample means. The enemy occupied a position between Steknitz and Bille.—It was on the night of the 4th that the general attack was to have taken place. The enemy had procured heavy artillery from Ratzburg, and had mounted all their batteries on the Elbe with it. I had caused counter batteries to be erected on my side; my troops were well disposed, and every thing announced a happy issue, when Marshal Walmoden sent to offer me new propositions.—Citizen First Consul, the Hanoverian army was reduced to despair, it implored your clemency. I thought you would wish to treat it with goodness when abandoned by its own King. In the middle of the Elbe I made the subjoined capitulation with Marshal Walmoden. He signed it with an afflicted heart. You will perceive by it that his army has laid down their arms, that his cavalry is dismounted, and surrenders to us near 4000 excellent horses. The soldiers returning to their homes are to apply themselves to agriculture, and are not to suffer any obstruction. They will no longer be under the command of England.—Health and profound respect. (Signed) ED. MORTIER.

P. S. It would be difficult to paint to you the situation of the fine regiment of the King of England's guards at the moment of dismounting.

The King of England having refused to ratify the Convention of Suhlingen; the First Consul finds himself obliged to regard that Convention as void. In consequence of this, Lieutenant-General Mortier, Commander in Chief of the French army, and his Excellency Count Walmoden, Commander in Chief of the Hanoverian army, have agreed on the following capitulation, which is to be executed immediately, without being submitted to ratification by either of the two governments:

1. The Hanoverian army shall lay down its arms. These, with all its artillery, shall be delivered up to the French army.—2. All the horses of the Hanoverian troops of cavalry, and the artillery horses shall be delivered to the French army, by a Member of the States of Hanover. A commission shall be sent from the General in Chief to take the state and distinctions of those horses.—3. The Hanoverian army shall be dissolved. The troops shall again pass the Elbe, and retire every one to his own home. They shall engage on their honour not to bear arms against France and his allies, without being exchanged

for French soldiers of the same rank, who have been made prisoners by England in the course of the war.—4. The Hanoverian Generals and Officers shall retire on their honour to the places which they may respectively chuse for their residence, but shall not leave the Continent. They shall retain their swords, horses, effects, and baggage.—5. There shall be delivered, with as little delay as possible, to the French Commander in Chief, a list of all the names of the individuals in the Hanoverian army.—6. The Hanoverian soldiers, after their return home, shall wear no uniform.—7. Subsistence shall be allowed to the Hanoverian troops, till the times of their return to their own places of residence. Forage shall be equally allowed for the horses of the officers.—8. The 16th and 17th articles of the Convention of Suhlingen shall remain applicable to the Hanoverian army.—9. The French troops shall, consequently, occupy that part of the Electorate of Hanover which is situate in Lauenburg.—Done in two copies, on the Elbe, this fifth day of July, 1803.—(Signed) ED. MORTIER,

Commander in Chief of the French Army.  
Marshal Count WALMODEN.

*Decree of the Government of the Batavian Republic, relative to British goods and merchandize.—Dated, Hague, July 5th, 1803.*

1. That, reckoning from the date of this law, no articles of merchandize, coming directly or indirectly from the kingdom of Great Britain, or from its colonies, shall be admitted into the ports of this Republic; but that all goods of this description, introduced into the said ports from the last day of July, in contravention to this order, shall be confiscated, and those which shall, in the course of July, be imported through ignorance of this prohibition shall be detained; and specific notes of the goods thus detained, with the day and place of detention, and the names of all the proprietors specified, shall be sent to the State Government, that it may determine according to the exigence of each case.—2. That, computing from the above date, neutral ships bound to ports in this Republic, shall have a certificate from the commissary or agent of this Republic for commercial relations, at the place from which they are freighted, or from the magistrate of the place, if no commercial agent or commissary be there resident; and the said certificate shall state the name of the ship and its captain, the nature of the cargo, the number of the men composing the crew, and the destination of the voyage.—3. That no captain of any merchant ship, wanting the proper certificate, by negligence, or a change in the destination of the voyage, shall be admitted into any port of this Republic, otherwise than on condition of taking in return, and exporting a cargo, consisting of products either of the soil of this country, or of the industry of its inhabitants, and amounting in value to the value of the goods by him imported.—4. That it is forbidden expressly to export, in any manner whatever, any article necessary to the building, the repairing, and the equipment of ships, or to transfer to the possession of foreigners, ships already built, or which may, at the date of this law, be in the ports of this Republic, which shall hereafter be built, or in any manner come into the proper possession of the inhabitants of this Republic, excepting only those particular cases, in which the Government of the State shall, to that effect, give its special consent; and on pain, that he who shall be convicted of



having directly or indirectly sold one or more ships to foreigners; or of having bought or received such ships for the account of any persons not inhabitants of this Republic, shall perfect the ships one or more, so bought or sold, and shall pay a fine equal to twice their value; or if the ships cannot be seized, to three times their value.

—5. That, moreover, and with confirmation, so far as need may be, it is by antient laws, still in force, forbidden to export, on any destination, any materials for the construction of ships, or other things necessary in war, arms, gunpowder, and saltpetre, except in the case in which that is done, by the consent and special authority of the State-Government, and with the necessary precautions. —6. That, in the last place, and with the same confirmation, so far as need may be, it is by laws, still in force, forbidden to export any provisions destined for the use of the enemy, on pain of confiscation of the provisions, and arbitrary punishment, according to the exigency of the case. —In consequence, the government ordains, that this present Act shall be published, and posted up, wherever it is fit that it should be known, and enjoins all concerned to see that it be exactly executed.

C. H. GOCKINGA.  
C. G. HULTMAN.

#### INTELLIGENCE.

**FOREIGN.**—Accounts received from Constantinople correct the accounts given in our last, of the revolt in Egypt, and state that Cairo, and not Alexandria, was the place wrested from the Porte by the Albanians. This event is said to have caused the greatest alarm at Constantinople, and a fleet which was fitting out there, was ordered immediately to Egypt. The Pacha of Damascus has defeated the Arabian rebel Abdul Wichab, near Medina, and completely routed his army.—The Emperor of Russia is continuing his tour, and on the 7th ult. was at Little Aspersfors in Sweden. The First Consul having left Lisle proceeded through Manin, Ypres, Dixmune, Nieuport, Ostend, and Bruges, and was expected to make his solemn entry into Brussels during the course of the present week.—The Dutch have prohibited the importation of any English merchandize into their country.

**DOMESTIC.**—A Bill was brought into Parliament by the Secretary at War on the 18th inst. for arming and training the whole country. Considerable debate took place on the subject between the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary at War, Mr. Windham, Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Fox. On the 21st a message was brought down from the Throne, recommending to Parliament the settlement of some pecuniary indemnity on the House of Orange.—The merchants, &c. of the City of London have

for the wives and families of those who may fall in the defence of the country.—The carriers in different parts of the kingdom have made liberal offers of waggons and horses for the service of government.—Lord Pelham has given orders that no neutral ships, having Italian silk on board, and bound for any part of his Majesty's dominions, shall be molested. The discussions between this government and the United States respecting the claims of the American citizens for captures by British cruizers during the last war, are now brought very near a conclusion. Last Friday the first instalment upon the awards of the Commissioners, amounting to about £400,000 became due, and was punctually paid by this government. The whole will amount to about £1,200,000. Stocks continue falling.

**MILITARY.**—The Hanoverian troops which were assembled on the right bank of the Elbe with a determination to oppose the French, capitulated on the 5th inst. to Gen. Mortier. The articles of capitulation will be found in page 109 of the present sheet. The Gallo-Italian army which entered the Neapolitan territories under the command of Gen. St. Ceyr, is extending along the coasts, and occupying the harbours. The Genoese troops are on their march for Romagna. The head quarters of the French division will be at Taranto, and the Italian at Chieti. The preparations for invasion are still going on in the ports of France and Holland with unabated activity. In every part of his Majesty's dominions, measures are taking for placing the military on the best possible footing; and providing the most effectual means of carrying on the war.

**NAVAL.**—Advices from Genoa, of the 20th ult. state that a French squadron of five ships of the line and six frigates has sailed from Toulon, and escaped the English fleet stationed in the Mediterranean. A Russian squadron, consisting of eleven ships of war, arrived at Warnemunden, near Rostock on the 10th inst.—Seven English frigates and a cutter were blockading the Elbe on the 11th inst. and the neutral ships which had put back had proceeded chiefly to Tonningen.—The Gazette of this week contains no official account of captures, but letters from all the sea port towns of Great-Britain furnish ample lists of valuable prizes which have been taken and sent in.

TO THE EDITOR.

July 18, 1803.

SIR,—I have just read over the Summary





of Politics, published in your Register of last Saturday; and do perfectly agree with you in the statement, which you make in pages 94, and 95, that "we must become a military people or slaves."—Indeed, this truth seems to have gained great ground of late, in consequence of the great alarm of invasion; and I am glad of it. The sooner that opinion becomes universal, the sooner shall we become such military people; and, I agree with you altogether, that it is only by so becoming that we can escape slavery. The reason for my troubling you at present, is not so much to press this necessity, as to give two or three hints concerning the manner of executing it, which, in reading your Register have just occurred to my mind.—One great misfortune, when a great work is to be undertaken, is for the undertaker to suppose, that his task is soon and easily accomplished. The effect of this opinion is, that he prepares himself to go through the job without any trouble or difficulty; and at the first obstacle is startled and disheartened. It is much better for a man to magnify to himself the dangers and difficulties of his enterprise, and then, by finding the blow so much less than he expected, he is always kept alive and in spirits.—It is therefore, of the greatest consequence, that when a great work is to be undertaken, all the difficulties of it should be well weighed and well calculated, or at least, certainly not under-rated.—It is to be observed, too, that the under-rating difficulties of any sort or kind is seldom witnessed but in those, who either out of dread of toil and labour, wish to disguise them from themselves; or, who feeling a momentary impulse of enthusiastic courage, during the impulse of that feeling think themselves capable of performing any achievement however great; but, who the next moment sink to proportionate depression and lowness of spirits.—Neither of these persons are in my mind at all fit for any difficult enterprise. It is the cool, steady, persevering men alone, who ever can undertake such a task with any prospect of success. If the hill is long and steep, and without resting places, it is only by the help of a firm steady pull, without any springs or jerks, that we can ever hope to arrive at the summit.—Now, this reasoning seems to me, precisely to apply to the mode, by which many seem to think, this avowed necessity of making the people of England a military people. They seem to imagine, that by admitting this necessity, and withal clapping a few red coats on peoples backs (particularly, if a bill is brought into Parliament for the purpose)

the work is already accomplished. Very different indeed, is my opinion. I am afraid it must be a work of time and much labour, and unremitting care. A work of so much time, that we may not now have time enough left; but still this is our only hope, and it must be attempted; and this dread of being too late *should* have no other effect but to quicken and animate our exertions.—Now, Sir, with respect to what is, and may be called "a Military People," and the mode of making a people such an one, I perhaps, may differ from the fashionable opinion, as much as I do differ from it with respect to the difficulties of the undertaking. Every man in the kingdom may have a red coat on his back, and a musquet on his shoulder, and yet the people as unlike a military people, as light from darkness. On the other hand, they may be a people completely military, without a single military accoutrement or weapon in their hands. For it is not military arms, and military bodies that we want, but military minds. It is the mind that makes the man. A military mind prevailing amongst a people will make that people a military people, and without it no people, however well trained to arms, will ever become so.

To make a people, therefore, a military people, it is necessary to give them a military mind; and to do this, you must first inquire, what is such a mind? I conceive that the very first and principal ingredient, is a thorough contempt for riches, ease, and luxury. The next no less important, a high and lofty spirit dictated by a genuine sense of honour, which will brook no insult, and suffer no indignity. Thirdly, a true generous love of the country, and an abandonment of every other earthly consideration when put in competition with its interests; such a love of the country, as makes the man who feels it, look upon its general interests as immediately affecting himself personally, and takes no consideration for his own comfort, safety, or gratification, whenever his country seems likely to want the slightest sacrifice of either. Fourthly, a love of glory, a thirst for renown, an ambition of distinguishing himself by great and useful exploits.—This I look upon as the feelings of a military mind; and without which no mind can so be called—and when a people generally entertain these feelings, and not till then, shall I call it a military people.

This, then, however difficult the task, however great the labour, we must do. It must instil into the people all these feelings, or become the slaves of France, of Buonaparte.



parté; the slaves of the most vindictive, bloody-minded, and impious tyrant that ever disgraced an empire: the slave of an ill-begotten Corsican, atheistical rebellious usurper.

In my mind, then, we have no alternative; either we must submit to the domination of France, or we must acquire generally that military mind, which I have described. There is no need for drilling and training; give a ploughman this mind, and he will be already half drilled, his zeal and good will, will render all the labours of his instructors unnecessary.

Before I conclude, I must again urge the absolute necessity of the first-mentioned ingredient; viz. a thorough contempt for riches. In opposition to the exultation of Mr. G. Rose, at the prospect of the people becoming rich in the stocks, I must urge, that till the people have an utter contempt for stocks and stock holders (as such) and care as little about their prosperity and depression, as about the whistling of the wind, they can never become a military people, they can never have a chance of escaping the above-mentioned slavery. The easiest and shortest way of effecting this, will be the ruin of the stocks, or what is called a national bankruptcy; by many thought to involve the immediate ruin of the country, by me looked upon with less certainty assuredly as the salvation of it, but with equal certainty as affording the best hope of salvation. When people have then lost their money, which now they esteem above all things, they will find that their lives and liberties are worth a little fighting for.

ANNIBAL.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have seen the Morning Chronicle of the day, and finding in it some expressions perfectly consonant to my own sentiments, very well and forcibly expressed, I have copied them out, and beg leave to send them to you in the shape of a postscript.—If there are any who entertain so bad an opinion of the populace of the country as to imagine that they are not to be trusted with arms, we can only say, that if this were the case, the country must perish if danger come near it. But in truth, the best way to secure the affections and fidelity of the multitude is to make them feel that they are important members of the state. *They must be attached to their country by passion. It is not enough to preach up to them how much they would lose by invasion. This argument will not of itself convince them that it is their interest to risk their lives to repel invasion. To make men encounter danger and death on principles of profit and loss is a*

*notion that could only originate in the head of a drivelling financier.* It is unquestionably true, that the poor, as well as the rich, would suffer by French invasion. It is right to impress on the minds of the people, that the conquest of England would plunge them in beggary and ruin. *But nevertheless they must be inspired with a filial love for their country, they must feel for its honour and glory.* But if they are thought unworthy of confidence, how can they be animated with any manly sentiment, or roused to any great exertion?

What the country wants most at this time is a martial spirit pervading every class of the community. If that is obtained, every military measure for arming the people will be easy in the execution. Without it the wisest will be impracticable. "Walled towns, (says Lord Bacon) stored arsenals and armouries, goodly races of horses, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like; all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike." And how is a people to be made stout and warlike but by the "exercise of a just and honourable war." Since Frenchmen profess arms as their chief occupation, other nations must cease to boast of their wealth, their industry, and their manufactures. They must cultivate the profession of arms too, or they must be conquered.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE BLOCKADE OF THE ELBE has drawn upon this country the rage of Buonaparté and the abuses of his hirelings, who write in the Moniteur. In proportion, however, as they are angry with us, we may rest assured, that our measures are wise and efficacious. The blockade of the Elbe is one of the best measures that ever was resolved on. It must tend to our good, and cannot possibly do any harm except to our enemy and to those who favour his cause; those who, either from weakness, or from hostility to us, are become, indirectly, his allies in the war. We gave it as our opinion, that, previously to the close of the last war, the war-like operations of England should be confined to the keeping of France shut up on the Continent; because, so shut up, she must sally out in quest of plunder, in quest of employment for her army, or her strength as well as her reputation must dwindle away from her inactivity. One species of continental war-fare, however, we connected with this general plan; that is, an invasion of France, in behalf, and—in the name



of, the lawful Sovereign of that country.—As to the use, which the French are making of *the press*, it is now becoming a matter of indifference. They have already got the opinions of all the people of the Continent on their side; or, at least, the opinions of all those who are liable to be misled by the press. In this country their writings can have little effect now: if they have, the fault is most assuredly with the government. We do hear, indeed, that there is, at this moment, *one* London press employed in printing “a justification of Buonaparté,” and we are informed, that it proceeds from a pen, which has so often been employed in belying and vilifying the King. This is an object worth the attention of the government; for, men will not cheerfully go forth to meet the foe, while the friends of that foe remain unpunished. That the insolent and hateful tyrant of France should be defended by the British press is by no means astonishing; that press has defended Robespierre and Barras, and it would have defended Caligula; but, that such infamous publications are circulated, without bringing condign punishment on the heads of those who circulate them cannot fail to excite both astonishment and indignation.

HANOVER.—The use, which the French intended to make of their conquest of this Electorate, has now been made apparent, through an official channel. “They only seized on it till the King of England would consent to give up Malta, and to restore to France all that his fleets had captured during the present war!” The answer returned by his Majesty’s ministers is by no means sufficiently indignant; by no means sufficiently strong, clear, and decisive, to convince us, that *no sacrifice* will be made, by this country, to recover the desolated, degraded, and polluted Electorate. Madame de Pompadour, in speaking of the conduct of this country, at the breaking out of the war of 1759, observes: “Providence seems to have intended HANOVER as a bridle in the mouth of the proud and ambitious English, who, surrounded by the sea and defended by their fleets, would, were it not for the *dear little Electorate*, be absolutely unassailable, except from the clouds.”—Let us hope, however, that this dear little Electorate will not, after being pillaged to the bare walls, be still a bridle in the mouth of Britain; a hope which is founded on the magnanimity of our Sovereign, rather than upon any quality, or any principles, that his servants seem to possess.—It certainly was wise

not to attempt to defend Hanover by *British troops*. Under the present circumstances, to send British troops into the territories of our helpless friends; to attempt at this moment, to carry on, against France, a war, either by troops or subsidy, in Holland, in Germany, in Italy, or in Portugal, would be, in our opinion, to afford Buonaparté the highest of all gratifications. By such attempts, we must ruin those whom our endeavours would be intended to relieve and sustain, and finally make them our enemies: we should waste our treasure, exhaust our army, fatigue, fret, and wear out the public spirit of the people, and prevent the doing away of that contempt, which the treaty of Amiens has excited, in the minds of foreigners, for British policy and British prowess. No; we must so fight France as to wound her, without exposing ourselves to the reaction of our blows. We should lose no time in adding the Cape of Good Hope to the British Empire; and, it should become a sort of treason for any man to propose the surrender of that port, or of Malta, under the present distribution of European power, upon any condition whatever. Saint Domingo should, by some means or other, be rendered, for ever independent of France; unless a restoration of the monarchy took place, accompanied with a restitution of *all* conquests. If, after having disposed of a sufficient force to keep France and her vassals confined to the Continent, we have 20,000 or 40,000 men to spare, they should be destined for the Garonne, or some other weak part of the French territory. We should destroy Bourdeaux, and so assault every other assailable place in France, as to make the French people feel themselves disgraced. Spain should be invited to shake off the Consular yoke; she should, at any rate, be compelled to preserve a scrupulously impartial neutrality; or her valuable settlements abroad should be seized on, or rendered independent, in which case Mexico might form a tolerably good “indemnity” for Hanover.—No little peddling plan of hostilities will carry us through these times: our enemy has long ago cast off all ancient rules; no ties but those of his own interest bind him; and, though we must not imitate him in injustice and perfidy, we must imitate him in *boldness*, or we must fall beneath his arms.

ENGLISH PRISONERS IN FRANCE.—Some persons have been proposing an exchange of the British subjects, who have been arrested in France, for French sailors and soldiers; but, if there be one drop of



honest blood left in the nation, this will never take place, without exciting an irresistible opposition. What! put men, who left their country, for the sake of mere amusement, and who remained in the dominions of an enemy who was daily heaping insults upon England; put such men upon a level with those who are taken in battle! If such a measure could be seriously thought of by the government, we should have no scruple to say, that, for our parts, we should leave that government to defend itself. Those persons, who have been arrested, while acting *there* in a public capacity; we mean, in the service of his Majesty, ought to be ransomed, if it can be done upon reasonable and honourable conditions; and also such persons, being in his Majesty's service, and having been arrested in their passage through France, *provided it was necessary for them to pass through France*; but, all others should be left to ransom themselves, or should remain in prison, waiting the good pleasure of the tyrant, whom they went to admire.

THE FUNDS have fallen again during the last week, and the reason assigned, is, the "unfortunate failure of the *mediation of Russia*;" just as if that mediation has, or ever has had, any thing in it, that promised peace to this country. It was an anodyne necklace, invented by Mr Fox and administered to the nation with the concurrent opinions of Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Pitt. Our readers will remember with what exultations of joy, what raptures of fraternity, the proposal to have recourse to mediation was adopted; and, they will remember, too, that *we*, from the first moment, reprobated the step, as being calculated to lull the nation in false hopes, and finally to expose it to the sudden attacks of the enemy.—Under the head of *funds* it might not be improper to ask Mr. Addington to give the public an account of the *surplus of the Consolidated Fund* for the quarter, which ended on the 5th instant! We shall, however, see it in good time; and, in the interim, we beg leave to congratulate the Omnium eaters upon the excellent bargain, which they made with their friend, the Minister of Peace and Plenty.—Mr. Corry, the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, does, it seems, not find such ready customers as his fellow-labourer in England found, notwithstanding the time which has elapsed since the English loan was made, and which has given people leisure to reflect on the vast benefit that public credit experiences from raising so great a portion of the taxes within the year. These remarks do not

arise from any particular pleasure which we feel at the fall in the funds; but from a desire to point out to our readers, that, when the nation is resolved on the performance of any thing, those funds will never prove a very serious obstacle.

DEFENCE BILL.—The bill now before Parliament for arming and training the people, is the most important measure that ever was taken in this country, not only within the memory of man, but at any period whatever of our history, from the first settlement of the Saxons to the present day.—As to the *time of bringing in this Bill* much censure has been justly bestowed on the ministers; for, if it had been brought in as soon as it might have been, the men of the first class would at this moment have been fit to march against the enemy, instead of being, as yet, unenrolled. Reserving this part of the subject for another opportunity, I propose, at present, to make a few observations on what appears to me to be the most material defects of the Bill, as it now stands.

1. *The time of execution* is far too distant. The first class are to be called out to be trained; but, as the bill now stands, it cannot be called out till within a day or two of Michaelmas, and between Michaelmas and Lady-Day it cannot, according to the general provision, be called out at all: so that, this regulation, which is intended to protect us against an invasion, which is daily expected, will not produce any effect in the way of training, till after the 25th of next March! This evil will assuredly be done away; but, it must be confessed, I should think, even by the most "hardened sinner" that ever lived, that what I have here pointed out is a striking proof, that this was at last an *undigested* measure.

2. *The Classification* is, in my opinion, injudicious, and will, if persisted in be extremely injurious to the whole plan. The general enrollment is good, and the partial, and, in some degree, optional, training I must approve of, unless I contradict my own opinions, as stated last week. The division into classes is excellent; and though it did, indeed, naturally present itself, yet, as governments do not always adopt measures that so present themselves, there is merit in having adopted this. But, as to the boundaries of the classes, I differ in opinion from the Secretary at War. Four is a very good number of classes; but the lines of demarcation are not drawn at the right places. The first class, which is, indeed, the only one worthy of great attention, embraces all men from 17 to 30 years of age, being unmarried or having no child. Now, all those



who are well acquainted with a military life, and particularly with the induction and training of soldiers, will, I am certain, agree with me, that this class is very injudiciously formed. To put together boys of seventeen and men of thirty, persons destitute of all possessions with others who have a house, goods, and a wife, would be a very good regulation, if, as in the case of coupling dogs, the object were to *restrain the ardour of youth*, and, for the very reason that it would then be good, it is now lamentably bad. — I would have had the first class begin at *sixteen* and end at *twenty-two*, excluding all married persons. Sixteen is by no means too early an age: I myself carried a musket at sixteen; and, the best battalion I ever saw in my life was composed of men, the far greater part of whom were enlisted before they were sixteen, and who, when they were first brought up to the regiment, were clothed in coats made much too long and too large, in order to leave room for *growing*. These boys learnt their exercise instantly; they were indissolubly attached to each other, and to the service; they had no hankering after any other state of life; and, in short, from their sentiments and behaviour compared with those of men enlisted at a more advanced period of life, I made up my opinion, that youth was the stuff wherewith to make soldiers, an opinion, which, I should think, would be universal after the experience that the world has had in the feats of the "*jeunes gens*" of France. — Youth is the season for pliability of body as well as for docility of mind. A man of thirty will not like to place himself in a posture, which shall expose him to what he looks upon as ridicule; nor will he very patiently submit to the controul of those who may have to command him, especially when, as must be frequently the case, they are not only his inferiors in point of property, but also in age: whereas, lads will experience none of these disagreeable feelings. They will not be abashed at the laughter excited by their awkwardness: theirs are the days of mirth; and, as to *obedience*, every one knows, that the younger we are the more willingly we submit to be led or directed by those whom we know to be our inferiors in society. — I am aware, that I shall be told, that it is *immediate* service that we are looking to. Be it so, and in that case even, were I to choose between a class like that of the bill and a class such as I propose, I would prefer the latter, relying much more on the enthusiasm of youth than on the strength of more

advanced age. There cannot be any thing very fatiguing in a British campaign; and, if there were, boys would support it better than men, as must be evident to every one who recollects how many things he bore at seventeen, either of which would have killed him at thirty. But, I am not for leaving *untrained* that material part of the population to be found between 20 and 30. No; the men falling within this space should be trained too; but they should be trained not so often as the First Class, and should never be mixed along with it. My great objection to the present classification, is, that it is calculated to damp the ardour of the youth; to stifle in its birth that generous feeling, that military spirit, which is so much wanted in the country. Bring together, under arms, a band of young men, divested of all care, leaving behind them neither wife, nor child, nor house, and you will find them pushing each other forward to deeds of danger and of glory; but, couple each of them with a man who has a wife, a shop, a farm, who has chalked out his plan of life, who has settled on the course and stages of his career of interest and happiness; couple every lad with a man like this, and let him, always when he is called out to drill, hear the complaints of his unwilling discontented, not to say factious, companion, and, will he not participate in his sentiments, will he not imitate his conduct? In short, it appears to me, that, to huddle together in the first class lads of seventeen and men of thirty, single and married, apprentices and masters, nephews and uncles, must create great disgust amongst the elder part of the class, and, which is of still more importance, must inevitably keep down that youthful ardour, which would otherwise be formed into a flame.

2. To pay the men for their time spent at drill appears to me to be bad in its principle; but, it arises out of the afore mentioned error as to the classification, which, indeed, if it be not corrected, will prove to be a source of evils unnumbered. Lads from 16 to 20, being unmarried, want no pay: they have fathers or masters, to support them; but poor married men, or men grown out of the protection of relations and masters, must be paid, if they are called out on the week-days, or the hardship and the clamour will be very great. It, therefore, the First Class were confined to unmarried persons from 16 to 20, to be drilled three or four times a week, and the Second Class to all the rest of those now included in the first, to be drilled only on Sundays,



there would be drilling enough going on without the necessity of any pay at all, and thereby we should get rid of an evil which is the greatest of the system, because it tends to degrade it.— On the topic of inconvenience and hardship to working people, and particularly to those employed in agriculture, it may not be amiss to observe, that the period allotted for the drill, to wit, from Lady Day to Michaelmas, embraces *seed time, hay making, harvest, and hop-gathering*, and, which is rather extraordinary, closes the moment those busy times are over, and that too at the commencement of a month, which, of the whole twelve, is usually the fairest, and, beyond all comparison, the best suited for practising military exercise. Why this arrangement, as to the time of training, has been adopted, I know not; but, I am afraid that the Secretary of War viewed the Bill, in this instance, with a lawyer's rather than with a soldier's eye. The ANNUNCIATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY, and the FEAST OF ST. MICHAEL, are excellent epochs for holding courts and paying rents; and, they are, too, ready at hand, when a person sits down to draw up a bill; but, with very great respect for the Secretary at War, I must assert, that to make Lady Day and Michaelmas the boundaries, on the present occasion, was to discover but a very moderate degree of reflection as to this part of the subject. October is undeniably the best month in the year for drilling. The sky is fair, the earth dry, the atmosphere temperate. It is the month of leisure; all the great fairs are held in it. It is just the time when farmer's servants change their places; when they go home to see their relations, when they ramble about the country, and when they want precisely that occupation which it is now proposed to give them at times when they have a thousand other things to do. I would have the first class drilled every week in the year, except in the months of December, January, and February, during which a weekly muster might be sufficient. From the middle of April to the end of May, and from the beginning of October to the middle of November, I would have them drilled three times a week: during the rest of the year, that is, during all the busy seasons, I would be content with a Sunday's drill.

3. *The bill does not make any specific provision for a drilling officer and a drummer.* This is a very great objection with me. The parishes, when small, are to be so classed together, as to collect a respectable number of persons for the drill; but, who

is to show the men thus collected how to use their arms? If the providing of an officer be left to the parish or district, it is to be supposed, that a proper person will be provided? How are parish officers to know who is a proper person, and, if they obtained that knowledge, which would be something very wonderful, where are they to look for their man? It appears to me, therefore, that the drilling officer should be appointed by the king, and should be paid, at a fixed rate and time, out of the treasury of the parish or district. Without some good and effectual provision of this sort, it is absolutely impossible that the men, whom the law will collect together, should ever learn any thing useful.—Some persons object to a *drum* as being likely to lead to all the ceremony of parade exercise amongst persons whom it is desirable to train to shooting at a mark, to bush fighting, and to other branches of duty more immediately connected with the ultimate object of raising a soldier, that is, the killing or capturing of the enemy. But, let it be remembered, that, before you can teach men even the art of shooting; before you can initiate them in the most simple part of the rudiments of military service; before, in short, you can do any thing at all with them, you must *collect them together*. This you cannot do without instrument, and no instrument is so good as the drum. By collecting them together, I do not here mean for the first time; that will be performed by the law, which will also appoint certain days for regularly assembling, and the men will come to the place accordingly. But, what is to bring them to *the very spot*, where they are to be drawn up in rank and file? Those who have had any thing to do with regular well disciplined soldiers, know how very difficult it is to manage any considerable number even of such men without the assistance of the drum; and what, then, must be the difficulty where there will be two or three hundred men, who are under no discipline at all, and whom no earthly lungs could either call together, or keep in silence? A *bugle horn* has been mentioned as a better instrument; but, if the people were equally fond of a bugle horn, it must be evident, that it is not an instrument so well calculated for the purpose. It requires a nice ear, or very long habit, to distinguish one sound of the bugle from another, whereas the beats of the drum are as distinct as different words, the bugler and the trumpeter make a noise which even the soldiers do not always understand, but the drummer *talks* to them at



a mile's distance.—Besides, as to exciting a military spirit, which, in every regulation of this sort, ought to be the main object, what instrument is there, a millionth part so efficacious as the drum? The drum rouses the mind more than any other species of noise, and for that reason it is the favourite of the common people, particularly the boys. Set a bugler at one end of a street and a drummer at the other; the latter you will see instantly surrounded with people, while the former will attract but very little attention. Were the object of the present bill merely to get together armed men for the threatened invasion only; then, indeed, I should say, that neither drums nor bugles would be of much consequence; but, the principal object, is, to create a military mind in the nation, to raise up the youth in military ideas and habits, and to make them look to the regular army as the scene of honourable elevation. Impressed with these considerations, it appears to me to be a great neglect, that no provision is made for providing each parish, or district, with a *flag*, or *standard*. This should have been by no means omitted. The boys, who are now from six to ten years of age, will, probably, be men, before this war is over: they will, at any rate, be big enough to carry arms in another war, if not in this war; and the things of which I am speaking are the means, the easy, the cheap, the pleasant, and the effectual means, of preparing them for, and leading them into, the army. An uniform silk standard, having on it the Crown, the G.R. and the name of the District and County, should, in my opinion, have been expressly provided for; and, the place of depositing it should, by all means, have been the Church. The weekly ceremony of taking out and of lodging these colours would engage the attention of the whole of a country parish; and, the flag itself, acquiring a sort of sanctity from the place of deposit, would be at once the symbol of patriotism, loyalty, and religion.

4. *The drilling on Sundays* is, it appears, contrary to the dictates of certain methodistical consciences. These people, whom one meets but too often, in the streets and elsewhere, have set up an outcry against the Sunday-drills, and have, in the most audacious manner, hinted menaces of *resistance*. That some allowance should be made for Scotland is reasonable: the Presbyterian is the *national Church* there, and the long established rules of that Church are very strict, with regard to the observance of the Lord's Day. But, while I am ready to make this allowance with respect to those who form

nine-tenths of the population of Scotland, I cannot but spurn at the thought of making all the people of England bend to the humour of a perverse, insolent, and factious sect, which does not consist of a sixteenth part of the population, which is unknown to the law, which has risen up out of the mine of ignorance, and which has spread itself through the country by the means of hypocrisy and impudence such as the world never before witnessed.—Of the six traitors, who were executed with Despard, and who had plotted the assassination of our Sovereign and the destruction of the government, *three* were *Methodists*, and had a methodist teacher to attend them in their last moments. This plotting sect had, at the time of Despard's conspiracy, a set of *Missionaries in France*, where I believe they still are; and, it will be recollected, that it was given in evidence, on the trial of Despard, that he postponed the attack of the Tower, till he received news and money *from France*. And these are the people, this is the canting sect, to indulge whose whims, or rather to favour whose factions, if not traitorous views, all the loyal people of this country are to be greatly distressed, or a law, intended to provide for the safety of the nation, is to be rendered inefficacious! Truly a modest pretension! Were it not that the sect would thereby be gratified, I should be very willing to leave them out of the drill and the enrollment altogether; for they are a worthless crew; they are the off-scourings of the community; wretches who have, generally speaking, been guilty of the most base and detestable crimes, and who having exhausted the pleasures of a profligate life are now enjoying the delights to be derived from hypocrisy. “The *blacker* the sinner the *brighter* the saint,” is a fundamental maxim of their creed; and those who know them best are the readiest to assert, that there are very few of them, who enter the sect destitute of claims to a high degree of this species of holiness.—It is amongst the country people, that the law which is now passing will have the most salutary effect; and, into this class, thank God, the impious and rebellious principles of the methodists have not yet penetrated far. The sect consists chiefly of grovelling wretches in and about great towns and manufacturing places; and those of them who get their living honestly, follow, for the most part, sedentary professions incompatible with that strength and hardihood requisite in a military life. It would, therefore, be no loss to exclude them from the enroll-



ment; but, it would be a trouble, which they have not a right to expect at the hands of public officers; it would be an indulgence to them, and they merit no indulgence! it would be to encourage that insolence, for which they ought to be punished; they would like it, and for that reason, if for no other, it ought not to be done.—

“Harmony!” We are to yield to those people for the sake of harmony! *Fifteen* persons are to yield to *one* for the sake of harmony! To reason against such an intolerable pretension would be an insult to my readers.—Let it be observed, that this sect, who generally get their living by means other than those of *day labour*; can so arrange matters as not to suffer any injury from a week-day drill, while such a drill must bring great inconvenience upon day-labouring men, and upon all men who work *out of doors*, which, as I before observed, the Methodists, in general, do not.—Sunday is, on every account the best day, and the time of the day just after morning service, which, for that reason, should begin at nine o'clock. Sunday is a day on which the cattle rest; but, if the men are at drill on the week-days, the horses and oxen must stand still the while, which will be severely felt, particularly in seed time, a season which, in England, admits of not a moment's intermission of labour. On Sunday the children, being let loose from school, and from those pestiferous prisons yeilded manufactories, may stretch their little cramped up limbs in following their seniors to the drill. Sunday is also the day for the women and girls to bestow their cheering approbation on those young men who distinguish themselves in their military exercises. And are all these advantages to be given up for the sake of having the “*good will*” of a set of hypocrites, who probably wish for nothing more ardently than for the success of a French invasion?

MESSRS. FOX AND SHERIDAN have made their appearance during the discussion of the bill now before Parliament. The former gentleman (respecting whom nothing can change our opinion) has thought proper to make an apology for his late absence. He did not come, because he *could not approve* of the measures that were going forward, and yet *he did not like to oppose them*. Why! this is precisely the reason that we gave for his absence; and we have now again to observe, that not one word has yet

escaped him hostile to Buonaparté, or to the “*monument of human wisdom*,” commonly called the Republic of France, but which is, in reality, the most degrading despotism that ever pressed upon the loins of a miserable people, who, in an evil hour, lent their ear to the harangues of a set of desperate demagogues, who, in order to retrieve their beggared fortunes, plunged their country into revolution and bloodshed.—No; not one word has he yet uttered against Buonaparté, or against the Republic, or against any thing French, the *family of the Bourbons* excepted. This is his *bête noire*. He seems to be afraid of nothing else; and the reason is simply this: he knows, that the restoration of that family is the only possible means of completely destroying the hopes of all those, who are engaged in such speculations as have engaged his mind for several years past. Why else should he hate the Bourbons? Never did they condescend to hate him, though it is not absolutely impossible, that he may have heard of their contempt of him.—But, how comes it, that he says nothing against the tyrant Buonaparté? The tyrant who wanted to destroy the *liberty of the press*! The glorious liberty of the press! How comes it, that Mr. Fox; the patriot Fox, the friend, the protector, the sentinel of liberty; how comes it, that he has heard of this in silence? Not one word has he uttered against it. Not one word has he said against the execrable tyrant. He still wanted to keep peace with him, on any terms.—We do hope, that the conduct of this man will be now fully exposed to the people of this country. Our endeavours shall not be wanting.—Mr. Sheridan, to whom we have, for weeks past, been looking for a little “*true English feeling*,” has not yet broken out. He did, indeed, make a slight opening the other night; but, so imperfect was it, so far short of the sallies that he was wont to make, that, after considerable altercation, it was impossible to determine *on which side he spoke!!!* He did, however, say, that there were certain topics, which he wished to have out; and, if Parliament should sit nine or ten weeks longer, we may hope to have a little fun.—Be this as it may, we are resolved to publish a full examination of his past public conduct compared with his present, and our readers may rely, that the materials, which we have collected for that purpose are not small in bulk.